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FUNCTUS OFFICIO: AUTHORITY OF THE
TRIAL COURT AFTER NOTICE OF APPEAL
THOMAS L. FOWLER

Effective appellate review generally requires that the status quo
between the parties to the litigation be maintained during the
pendency of the appeal. In support of this requirement of effective
appellate review, a rule has developed that the trial court becomes
functus officio, i.e., deprived of jurisdiction to take any further
action in the matter, upon a party'sfiling of notice of appeal. This
rule is not, however, as absolute as its languagesuggests. The rule
is subject to numerous exceptions and qualifications which arise
because of the needs of an efficient judicial process, and the need,
in some cases, of ongoing trial level supervision of the parties'
relationship during the time the appeals process is running its
course.
This Article reviews the rule, its exceptions and
qualifications,and theirjustifications,and concludes that this is an
area where the law is still evolving.
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INTRODUCTION

[U]pon filing of a notice of appeal, a trial court in North
Carolina is divested of jurisdiction with regard to all matters
embraced within or affected by the judgment which is the
subject of the appeal.'
The long-standing, oft-cited general rule is that the trial court is
divested of jurisdiction when a party gives notice of appeal and,
pending the appeal, the trial judge is functus officio.2 The rule has
been applied to hold that after a party has given notice of appeal of
the trial court's judgment, the trial court is without jurisdiction to

1. Brooks v. Giesey, 106 N.C. App. 586, 590-91,418 S.E.2d 236, 238 (1992).
2. Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 580, 273 S.E.2d 247, 258 (1981) ("The wellestablished rule of law is that 'an appeal from a judgment rendered in the Superior Court
suspends all further proceedings in the cause in that court, pending the appeal.' ") (citing
Harris v. Fairly, 232 N.C. 555, 556, 61 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1950)); Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co.,
292 N.C. 633, 635, 234 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1977); Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 197, 217 S.E.2d
532, 541 (1975); Hoke v. Atd. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408
(1947). Functus officio means "a task performed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 802 (7th
ed. 1999).
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consider the prevailing party's motion for attorney fees. 3 Similarly,
after appeal from a judgment, the trial court has been held without
jurisdiction, pending the appeal, to hold a party in contempt for
failing to comply with the judgment.4 And, clearly, if a party appeals

an immediately appealable interlocutory order, the trial court does
not have authority, pending the appeal, to proceed with the trial of
the matter.
Nevertheless, the general rule, as stated, is somewhat misleading.
For instance, there are many exceptions to this rule, where even after
notice of appeal is given, the trial court retains authority to make
rulings in the matter. Also, in the case of most appeals, i.e., appeals
from final judgments, the trial court is arguably functus officio not so
much because of the notice of appeal but because, having rendered its
final judgment,6 the trial court has completed all of its duties vis-A-vis

the matter before it.7 The rule can also be misleading when the
decision being appealed is an interlocutory order.8 In some cases,
appeal of an interlocutory order has been held to void the subsequent
trial that proceeded despite the pending appeal-but in other cases

the subsequent trial that proceeded during the pending appeal was
upheld. Contrary to the general rule, then, mere notice of appeal9
3. Gibbons v. Cole, 132 N.C. App. 777, 782, 513 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1999).
4. Webb v. Webb, 50 N.C. App. 677, 678, 274 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1981); Beall v. Beall,
290 N.C. 669, 680, 228 S.E.2d 407, 413 (1976); see also Wilson v. Wilson, 124 N.C. App.
371, 376, 477 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1996) (holding that after notice of appeal, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to enter a contempt order based upon the appealed order).
5. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 25 N.C. App. 307, 308, 212 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1975)
(holding the trial court to be functus officio after an appeal from an interlocutory order);
Patrick v. Hurdle, 7 N.C. App. 44, 45, 171 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1969) (stating that because an
appeal from an appealable interlocutory order stays all further proceedings in the trial
court, the trial court was functus officio to try the case, and it follows that the trial, the
verdict, and the judgment are nullities).
6. A final judgment "disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be
judicially determined between them in the trial court." Veazey v. City of Durham, 231
N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950).
7. See State v. Alphin, 81 N.C. 566, 566-567 (1879) (finding the trial court to be
functus officio after the term expired in which the final judgment had been entered-not
because notice of appeal had been filed); Bible Soc'y v. Hollister, 54 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) 10,
19 (1853) (stating that where a case has been "heard and determined," the supreme court
becomes "functus officio as to the case itself, and all its incidents").
8. An interlocutory order is any order or judgment made during the pendency of an
action that is not a final judgment. It "does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for
further action." Veazey, 231 N.C. at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381.
9. It is actually the perfection of an appeal that serves to divest the trial court of
jurisdiction, rather than the notice of appeal. However, although an appeal is not
"perfected" until duly docketed in the appellate court, such perfection relates back to the
time notice of appeal was given, so that in cases where the appeal is perfected, it is the
notice of appeal that effectively terminates the trial court's jurisdiction. See Lowder v.
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will not always render the trial court functus officio.
The functus officio rule and its exceptions are best considered in
the context of the demands of an effective appellate procedure."0 The
functus officio rule exists to provide the legal framework necessary to
protect the right of appeal and to effectuate the appeals process itself.
In this context, the rule and its exceptions often make sense. Section
I of this Article reviews the appeals process and summarizes the
functus officio rule in that context. Section II reviews the various
exceptions to the rule and their development in recent case law and
statutes. For the most part, these exceptions represent compromises
between the clear needs of the North Carolina appeals process and
the equally clear concerns with the injustice and inefficiency that
often accompany the unavoidable delay occasioned by appellate
review. 1
I. THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

The purpose of mandating a right of appeal is to provide a
litigant with an opportunity to correct prejudicial errors that occurred
at trial." The value to a litigant of this right of appeal might be
Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 581, 273 S.E.2d 247, 259 (1981).
10. "Back of every legal principle lies the reason that gave it birth. Hence, a rule of
law can best be interpreted and applied if due heed is paid to the reason which called it
into being." Veazey, 231 N.C. at 363, 57 S.E.2d at 382.
11. Generally, two courts should not have jurisdiction of the same case at the same
time. See Childs v. Martin, 69 N.C. 126, 126-27 (1873) (explaining that when two courts
have concurrent jurisdiction of a case, the court in which suit is first brought acquires
jurisdiction and excludes the jurisdiction of the other court); State v. Reid, 18 N.C. (3 & 4
Dev. & Bat.) 377, 379 (1835).
12. See A.B.A. JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE

COURTS § 3.00 cmt., at 5 (1994) (defining the two basic functions of appellate courts as (1)
error correction: reviewing trial court proceedings to determine whether they have been
conducted according to law and applicable procedure, and (2) law development:
developing the rules of law that are within the competence of the judicial branch to
announce and interpret). The importance of the error correction function has been
explained as follows:
[A]ppellate courts serve as the instrument of accountability for those who make
the basic decisions in trial courts and administrative agencies .... The availability
of the appellate process assures the decision-makers at the first level that their
correct judgments will not be, or appear to be, the unconnected actions of
isolated individuals, but will have the concerted support of the legal system; and
it assures litigants that the decision in their case is not prey to the failings of
whichever mortal happened to render it, but bears the institutional imprimatur
and approval of the whole social order as represented by its legal system. Thus,
the review for correctness serves to reinforce the dignity, authority, and
acceptability of the trial, and to control the adverse effects of any personal
shortcomings of the basic decisionmakers.
PAUL D. CARRINGTON, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976); see also State v. Colson, 274 N.C.
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significantly reduced if the opposing party were allowed, pending the
appeal, to proceed in the trial court to enforce or otherwise use,
directly or indirectly, the allegedly improper ruling of the trial court.
Appellate review takes time, and the situation of the parties should
be maintained during the time the appellate court is determining
whether the trial court's actions were correct. 3 Additionally, the
legal issues to be appealed must be documented and finalized.
Continued activity in the case by the trial court during the pendency
of the appeal could result in a series of efforts by the parties to amend
the record on appeal, to add or alter assignments of error, 14 or even to
raise mootness 15 as a basis for dismissing the appeal. An effective
appellate procedure thus requires a stable case-that is, the appellate
record and the parties' relative legal positions must be fixed during
the pendency of the appeal. As a general rule this is accomplished by
limiting the activity in the trial court.
Limiting the activity in the trial court during the appeal could be
accomplished in several ways: (1) the appeal could operate to vacate
the trial court's order or judgment that is being appealed, subject to
reinstatement if the appellate court denies the appeal; 6 (2) the appeal
295, 304, 163 S.E.2d 376, 382 (1968) (noting the basic principle that there should be one
trial on the merits and one appeal on the law, as of right, in every case).
13. "[T]he law's delay has been a chronic lament among men for centuries ..
Veazey, 231 N.C. at 363, 57 S.E.2d at 382 (1950). The Supreme Court of North Carolina
has acknowledged that "[w]here time is of the essence, the appellate process is not the
procedural mechanism best suited for resolving the dispute." A.E.P. Indus. v. McClure,
308 N.C. 393, 401, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759 (1983).
14. "A trial court's order settling the record on appeal is final and will not be
reviewed on appeal." Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 363, 520 S.E.2d 105, 108
(1999). Furthermore," '[r]eview of an order settling the record on appeal is available, if at
all, only by way of certiorari.'" Bledsole v. Johnson, 150 N.C. App. 619, 623, 564 S.E.2d
902, 905 (2002) (quoting Penland, 135 N.C. App. at 363, 520 S.E.2d at 108).
15. Failure to preserve the status quo can render moot the issues raised on appeal and
so requires dismissal of the appeal. See In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 694, 231 S.E.2d 633,
634 (1977) ("When events occur during the pendency of an appeal which cause the
underlying controversy to cease to exist, the appellate court properly refuses to entertain
the cause merely to adjudicate abstract propositions of law."); Estates, Inc. v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 130 N.C. App. 664, 666, 504 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1998); Crumpler v. Thornburg,
92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989) ("If no genuine present controversy
exists between the parties, a case which was once alive becomes moot.").
16. This appears to have been the approach followed by the courts in the first half of
the 19th century. See Bond v. Wool, 113 N.C. 20, 21, 18 S.E. 77 (1893) (noting that when
based on new statutes, the judgment of the superior court was not vacated by the appeal
but "merely suspended," and the suspension ended with the affirmation of the judgment
by the supreme court); ATWELL MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 650 (1929); cf State v. Applewhite, 75 N.C. 229, 230 (1876)
(holding that a criminal defendant's appeal vacated the judgment and sentence). This
approach was expressly disavowed by a statute adopted in 1868 which is currently codified
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could operate to stay all proceedings in the trial court pending the
appeal;'7 or (3) the appeal could operate to divest the trial court of
jurisdiction over the matter pending the appeal. The functus officio
rule purports to follow the latter approach.18
as section 1-296 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-296
(2001) ("The stay of proceedings provided for in this Article shall not be construed to
vacate the judgment appealed from, but in all cases such judgment remains in full force
and effect ....).
17. The acts of the legislature now codified as sections 1-285, 1-289, 1-290, 1-291, 1292, and 1-294 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which provide for appeal bonds
and procedures for staying execution of certain judgments, were originally passed in 1868.
See N.C. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE tit. 13, § 303, 312 (1868) (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-285 (2001)); tit. 13, § 304, 311 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1289); tit. 13, § 305 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-290); tit. 13, § 306 (current
version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-291); tit. 13, § 307 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1292); tit. 13, § 308 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294). Section 1-294 provides
that if the procedures specified in these statutes are followed, then "all further proceedings
in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced
therein" are stayed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2001). If these provisions are not followed,
the result is simply that the execution of the judgment is not stayed pending appeal-but
the appeal can still proceed. See Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N.C. 81, 84-85 (1873); N.C. R. CIV.
P. 62.
18. Some cases blur the distinction between the functus officio rule and the stay
provision of section 1-294. The supreme court cases that cite the "longstanding general
rule," i.e., the functus officio rule, do not cite section 1-294 or its precursors as authority
for the rule. Hoke v. Atl. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947)
("An appeal from a judgment rendered in the Superior Court takes the case out of the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Thereafter, pending the appeal, the judge is functus
officio."). Hoke cites eight cases, none of which mention the statute. See id. Three of the
cases cited are: Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 635, 234 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1977);
Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 108, 184 S.E.2d 879, 880 (1971); and Machine Co. v.
Dixon, 260 N.C. 732, 735-36, 133 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1963). In Bowen, the supreme court
stated:
[O]ur longstanding general rule that an appeal removes a case from the
jurisdiction of the trial court and, pending the appeal, the trial judge is functus
officio. The rule is subject to two exceptions and one qualification. The
exceptions are that notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal the trial judge
retains jurisdiction over the cause (1) during the session in which the judgment
appealed from was rendered and (2) for the purpose of settling the case on
appeal. The qualification to the general rule is that "the trial judge, after notice
and on proper showing, may adjudge the appeal has been abandoned" and
thereby regain jurisdiction of the cause.
Bowen, 292 N.C. at 635, 234 S.E.2d at 749 (quoting Machine Co., 260 N.C. at 735-36, 133
S.E.2d at 662). These cases also state that the functus officio rule renders the lower court
without jurisdiction to enter orders-rather than explaining that the appellate courts or
the statutes have "stayed" lower court activity. Id.; Wiggins, 280 N.C. at 108, 184 S.E.2d at
880; Machine Co., 260 N.C. at 735-36, 133 S.E.2d at 662. The Hoke court stated that its
decision was based "squarely on the want of jurisdiction in the court below" after notice of
appeal was given. Hoke, 227 N.C. at 376, 42 S.E.2d at 408. Yet some court of appeals
cases appear to find the basis for the functus officio rule in the stay language of section 1294. In Curry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., the court of appeals misleadingly
paraphrased section 1-294 as follows: "[w]hen an appeal is perfected ... it stays all further
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Appealability: FinalJudgments Versus Interlocutory Orders

In general, North Carolina's appellate procedure is designed to
eliminate the unnecessary delay and the expense associated with
repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for
determination in a single appeal from the final judgment.19 A final
judgment disposes of all issues as to all parties leaving nothing to be
judicially determined by the trial court."0 Final judgments are always
appealable.2'
All other judgments or orders of the court are
interlocutory. 2 An appeal of an interlocutory order usually must be
accomplished as a part of the appeal from the final judgment.23
Immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is allowed, however, in
two instances: (1) when the challenged order affects a substantial
right pursuant to sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d) of the General Statutes
of North Carolina 24 and (2) when the order is final as to some but not
all of the claims or parties, and the trial court certifies the case for
appeal pursuant to Civil Rule 54(b) 25 by finding that there is no just
reason for delay.26
Attempted appeals of non-immediately
proceedings in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter
embraced therein .... 125 N.C. App. 108, 112, 479 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1997). It then cited
both section 1-294 and the functus officio rules as the basis for its conclusion that the trial
court was ousted of jurisdiction by notice of appeal. Id.; cf. Woodard v. Local Gov't
Employee Ret. Sys., 110 N.C. App. 83, 85, 428 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1993) (citing both section
1-294 and case law for functus officio rule); Corbett v. Corbett, 67 N.C. App. 754, 756, 313
S.E.2d 888, 889 (1984) (paraphrasing section 1-294 as providing that an appeal "stays all
further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the
matter embraced therein; but the court below may proceed upon any other matter
included in the action and not affected by the judgment appealed from"). Section 1-294
actually provides that it applies only "[w]hen an appeal is perfected as provided by this
Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2001) (emphasis added). This arguably applies only to
the procedures for automatic stays for certain kinds of judgments as specified in the article
in sections 1-289, 1-290, 1-291, and 1-292. But see Beau Rivage Plantation v. Melex USA,
Inc., 112 N.C. App. 446, 452, 436 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1993) (declining to apply "a literal
reading of section 1-294," which if "considered alone," would have "appear[ed] to support
plaintiff's position").
19. Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529-30, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951).
20. Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377,381 (1950).
21. Embler v. Embler, 143 N.C. App. 162,164,545 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2001).
22. See Veazey, 231 N.C. at 361-62, 57 S.E.2d at 381.
23. Morris Communications Corp. v. City of Asheville, 145 N.C. App. 597, 603, 551
S.E.2d 508, 513 (2001) ("As a general rule, a party has no right to immediate appellate
review of an interlocutory order."), rev'd on other grounds, 356 N.C. 103, 565 S.E.2d 70
(2002); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-278 (2001) ("[U]pon an appeal from a judgment, the
court may review any intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the
judgment.").
24. §§ 1-227, 7A-27(d).
25. N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
26. Prior to 1868, interlocutory orders were immediately appealable in the discretion
of the trial court. See Goodbread v. Wells, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 324, 325 (1839)
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appealable determinations of the trial court do not implicate the
functus officio rule, and the trial court is not thereby divested of
jurisdiction to proceed with the case.27
Sometimes when a party appeals from a purported final
judgment, the appellate court will determine that the judgment is not
actually final and so there is no right of appeal based on its finality. z8
If not final, the court's determination is interlocutory and any right of
appeal must be based on whether the order affects a substantial right
or has been properly certified pursuant to Civil Rule 54(b). Although
the consequences, being jurisdictional, are extreme, the
determination of the immediate appealability of an interlocutory
order is not always easily made.
B.

Interlocutory Orders That Affect a SubstantialRight

1. Appeal of an Immediately Appealable Interlocutory Order
Filing notice of appeal of an interlocutory order that affects a
substantial right, i.e., an immediately appealable interlocutory order,
renders the trial court functus officio to proceed with the trial. For
instance, in Patrick v. Hurdle,29 the plaintiff's motion for a change of

venue was granted and the matter was calendared for trial in the new
county. 3° Defendant, however, filed a timely notice of appeal of the
order granting the change of venue.31 The appeal was properly
perfected and the court of appeals ultimately reversed the order
granting the venue change.32 In the interim, however, the trial judge
proceeded with the trial of the matter and reached a final judgment.33
The court of appeals vacated this final judgment, noting:
An appeal from an appealable interlocutory order carries
(holding that the trial court has discretion to allow appeal of interlocutory order);
MCINTOSH, supra note 16, § 21 ("[I]t was within the discretion of the superior court to
allow an appeal from an interlocutory order.").
27. See State v. Triplett, 10 N.C. App. 165, 167, 178 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1970) ("[Nlotice of
appeal from a void order does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to enter
subsequent orders in the cause.").
28. See, e.g., Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. McNiel, 327 N.C. 234, 242, 393 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1990)
(stating that there can be no appeal where there is no judgment); see also Beau Rivage
Plantation v. Melex USA, Inc., 112 N.C. App. 446, 452, 436 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1993) ("[T]he
threshold and dispositive question is whether the trial court's order ... had the requisite
finality to make it subject to immediate appeal.").
29. 7 N.C. App. 44,171 S.E.2d 58 (1969).
30. Id. at 45, 171 S.E.2d at 59.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the interlocutory order and all questions incident to and
necessarily involved therein to the appellate division. And the
appeal stays all further proceedings in the trial court upon the
order appealed from, or upon the matters embraced therein.
The very question sought to be determined by the former
appeal was the right of the Superior Court of Currituck County
to transfer this case to the Superior Court of Pasquotank
County for trial; therefore, the Superior Court of Pasquotank
County was without jurisdiction to try the case pending the
appeal.
Since the Superior Court of Pasquotank County was
functus officio to try the case, it follows that the trial, the

verdict and the judgment are nullities.34

2. Appeal of an Interlocutory Order That Is Not Immediately
Appealable
Filing notice of appeal of an interlocutory order that does not
affect a substantial right, i.e., a non-immediately appealable
interlocutory order, does not render the trial court functus officio to
proceed with the trial. For instance, in T& T Development Co., Inc. v.
Southern National Bank,35 the trial court granted the defendant's

motion in limine to exclude certain evidence at the trial. 36 The
plaintiffs immediately gave notice of appeal of this order and, when
the trial court called the case for trial, the plaintiffs refused to offer
any evidence on the ground that the trial court was functus officio.37

The trial court then granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims.38 On appeal, the court of appeals held that because
the plaintiffs had no right to appeal the granting of the motion in

limine, the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction and did not err

34. Id. at 45-46, 171 S.E.2d at 59 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 25 N.C. App. 307, 308, 212 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1975) (deciding that
the district court was without jurisdiction to enter further orders while an appeal was
pending). But cf. Providian Nat'l Bank v. Bryant, No. COA01-1546, 2003 WL 138928, at
*3 (N.C. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (acknowledging that an interlocutory order for sanctions was
immediately appealable pursuant to section 1-277 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, but deciding that the trial judge had discretion to proceed with the trial de novo
while the appeal was pending). The decision in ProvidianNational Bank may have been
based on the conclusion that the trial on the merits was not incident to and necessarily
involved with the sanctions matter being appealed. See id.
35. 125 N.C. App. 600, 481 S.E.2d 347 (1997).
36. Id. at 601,481 S.E.2d at 348.
37. Id. at 602, 481 S.E.2d at 348.
38. Id.
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in calling the case for trial and' dismissing it when plaintiffs failed to
offer any evidence.3 9 The court stated: "Although an appeal
generally divests the trial court of jurisdiction, an appeal from a nonimmediately appealable order does not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to try and determine a case on its merits."4
Thus the case law is clear that a trial judge has the authority to
decide whether the attempted appeal is of a nonappealable
interlocutory order. If so, the functus officio rule does not apply. The
trial court is not required to await the appellate court's decision
whether the attempted appeal is, indeed, of a nonappealable
interlocutory order.4 If the trial court reaches this conclusion, it can
proceed with the matter, and if it is correct in its conclusion, it is not
functus officio.
What if the trial court reasonably concludes that the
interlocutory order being appealed does not affect a substantial right
and proceeds with the trial to final judgment, but the appellate court
later concludes that the interlocutory order was immediately
appealable? The rule would seem to be clear that, in this case, the
trial court was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to proceed-and
that the reasonableness of the trial judge's conclusion that the
interlocutory order did not affect a substantial right has no legal
significance. Nevertheless, a recent case held differently.
3. Appeal of an Interlocutory Order That Is Unexpectedly Found to
Be Immediately Appealable
In RPR & Associates, Inc. v. University of North Carolina-Chapel
the trial court denied defendant's Rule 12(b)4 3 motions to

Hill,4 2

39. Id. at 603, 481 S.E.2d at 349.
40. Id. at 605, 481 S.E.2d at 349; see also Velez v. Dick Keffer Pontiac-GMC Truck,
144 N.C. App. 589, 591, 551 S.E.2d 873, 875 (2001) (holding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to enter an order compelling discovery against defendant-bank, even though
defendant-dealer's appeal of an order compelling discovery against it was then pending,
where the order against the dealer was interlocutory and not immediately appealable);
Harris v. Harris, 58 N.C. App. 175, 177, 292 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1982) (explaining that an
attempted appeal from a non-appealable order is a nullity and does not deprive the
tribunal from which the appeal is taken of jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.C.
684, 300 S.E.2d 369 (1983).
41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also RPR & Assocs. v. Univ. of
N.C.-Chapel Hill, 153 N.C. App. 342, 349, 570 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2002) ("[T]he trial court
had the authority to determine whether its order affected defendant's substantial rights or
was otherwise immediately appealable ....). But see Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App.
627, 640, 321 S.E.2d 240, 246 (1984) ("[Rjuling on the interlocutory nature of appeals is
properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court.").
42. 153 N.C. App. 342,570 S.E.2d 510 (2002).
43. N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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dismiss, and the defendant filed notice of appeal." The plaintiff
continued to pursue its claims in superior court, and the defendant
sought a stay from the trial judge, contending that its notice of appeal
removed jurisdiction from the trial court pending resolution of the
appeal." The plaintiff responded that the order denying the 12(b)
motions was interlocutory and nonappealable, so that notice of
appeal did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with
the case.46 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to stay the
proceedings, and the defendant thereafter filed a petition for writs of
certiorari and supersedeas4 7 with the court of appeals and moved for a
stay of the trial court proceedings.48 The court of appeals initially
granted the defendant's motion for a stay but later dissolved the stay
and denied the writs.49 The defendant renewed its motion for a stay
in the trial court and it was again denied." The trial court proceeded
with the matter, heard the evidence, and reached a final decision on
the merits prior to the court of appeals' resolution of the defendant's
appeal.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that because the
motion to dismiss was based in part on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the denial of such motion affected a substantial right, thus
rendering the decision of the trial court immediately appealable. 2
However, the court then concluded that the trial court had properly
denied defendant's motions to dismiss.5 Nevertheless, the defendant
argued to the court 54 that the final judgment of the trial court had to
be a nullity because, even if the trial court's denials of the Rule 12(b)
motions was technically correct, the immediate appeal of the denials
rendered the trial court functus officio to proceed with the merits of
the case.55
Surprisingly, the court of appeals overruled this
44.
45.
46.
47.

RPR & Assocs., 153 N.C. App. at 344,570 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
Id. at 344-45, 570 S.E.2d at 512.
"After a stay order or entry has been denied or vacated by a trial court, an

appellant may apply to the appropriate appellate court for a writ of supersedeas in
accordance with Rule 23." N.C. R. APP. P. 8(a); see also N.C. R. APP. P. 23 (describing

how to seek a writ of supersedeas).
48. RPR & Assocs., 153 N.C. App. at 345, 570 S.E.2d at 512.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 346, 570 S.E.2d at 513.

52. Id. at 348-49, 570 S.E.2d at 514-15.
53. Id.
54. This was the second time the case was appealed to the court of appeals. See RPR
& Assocs. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525,525,534 S.E.2d 247,247 (2000); RPR & Assocs., 153

N.C. App. at 342, 570 S.E.2d at 510.
55. RPR & Assocs., 153 N.C. App. at 348, 570 S.E.2d at 514.
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assignment of error." 6
The court acknowledged the general functus officio rule, but then
focused on the "reasonableness of the trial court's decision" to
proceed with trial on its belief that the orders were not immediately
appealable-"underscored by the fact" that the appellate courts had
"repeatedly rejected defendant's attempts to stay the lower court
proceedings or otherwise remove jurisdiction from the trial court."57
The court concluded:
Because the trial court had the authority to determine whether
its order affected defendant's substantial rights or was
otherwise immediately appealable, the trial court did not err in
continuing to exercise jurisdiction over this case after defendant
filed its notice of appeal. The trial court's determination that
the order was nonappealable was reasonable in light of
established precedent and the repeated denials by the appellate
courts of this State to stay proceedings. Although this Court
ultimately held that defendant's appeal affected a substantial
right, it also held that defendant was not immune to suit.
Defendant states no grounds, nor has it produced any evidence
to demonstrate how it was prejudiced by the trial court's
exercise of jurisdiction over this case."
4. The Rule Applied in RPR & Associates, Inc.: Misguided Because
the Functus Officio Rule Is Jurisdictional and Not Discretionary
The test for determining when an interlocutory order affects a
substantial right and is immediately appealable has never been an
easy one to apply. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has stated:
Admittedly the "substantial right" test for appealability of
interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied. It is
usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by
considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural
context in which the order from which appeal is sought was
entered. 9

56. Id. at 349, 570 S.E.2d at 515.
57. Id. at 348, 570 S.E.2d at 514-15.
58. Id. at 349, 570 S.E.2d at 515.
59. Waters v. Pers. Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978); see also Cagle v.
Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 245,431 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1993) ("[N]o hard and fast rules exist
for determining which appeals affect a substantial right."). See generally J. Brad Donovan,
The Substantial Right Doctrine and Interlocutory Appeals, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71
(1995) (summarizing the North Carolina cases applying the substantial right test); Willis
Whichard, Appealability in North Carolina: Common Law Definitions of the Statutory
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It is clear, however, that the matter is properly considered by the trial
court when an interlocutory order is appealed before or during trial,
and that if it is a close call the trial court or the appellate court can
grant a stay of the trial proceedings pending the appellate court's
resolution of the matter." This seems a reasonable remedy for those
situations where the substantial right question is legitimate and the
appellant is not simply attempting improperly to stall the
proceedings.6'
The new rule applied in RPR & Associates, Inc. v. University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill,62 seems both unnecessary and
inconsistent with the basic functus officio rule. If jurisdiction is
removed from the trial court when a party seeks to appeal an order
that North Carolina laws stipulate is immediately appealable, then the
appellate system is undermined by allowing the trial proceedings
effectively to continue while the appeal is unresolved. Importantly,
the jurisdiction of a court is that court's only legitimacy-it is the only
basis for that court's power authoritatively to address an issue.63
North Carolina case law is clear that subject matter jurisdiction is not
If the trial
conferred upon a court by consent, waiver, or estoppel.'
court in RPR & Associates lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the
trial, as the functus officio rule seems to clearly state,65 it is difficult to
understand how it is relevant that the defendant "state[d] no grounds,
nor ...produced any evidence to demonstrate how it was prejudiced
Substantial Rights Doctrine,47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1984) (explaining the test
for determining a substantial right).
60. See N.C. R. APP. P. 8 (stating that a party may apply to the appellate courts for a
stay when the trial court opts to proceed with the matter).
61. See Velez v. Dick Keffer Pontiac-GMC Truck, 144 N.C. App. 589, 591, 551 S.E.2d
873, 875 (2001) ("[A] litigant cannot deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to determine a
case on its merits by appealing from a non-appealable interlocutory order of the trial

court.").
62. 153 N.C. App. 342, 570 S.E.2d 510 (2002).
63. Subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial authority
over any case or controversy. Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673,
675 (1987).
64. See, e.g., Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126, 129, 193 S.E. 286, 288 (1937) (stating that
a party may not waive jurisdiction); Deep River Citizens v. N.C. Dept. of Env't., 119 N.C.
App. 232, 235, 457 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1995) (stating that jurisdiction can not be conferred
upon a court by consent, waiver, or estoppel); State v. Earley, 24 N.C. App. 387, 389, 210
S.E.2d 541, 543 (1975) (same).
65. In Hoke v. Atl. Greyhound Corp., the court stated that its decision was based
"squarely on the want of jurisdiction in the court below" after notice of appeal was given.
227 N.C. 374, 376, 42 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1947). Additionally, the case law consistently
describes a lower court order that violates the functus officio rule as a "nullity"-a
judgment by a court without jurisdiction is a void judgment and a void judgment is a
nullity. See MCINTOSH, supra note 16, § 651.
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by the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over this case," as the court
of appeals stated.66
In Patrick v. Hurdle,67 discussed above, the defendant properly
appealed an immediately appealable interlocutory order and declined
to participate in the trial of the matter that the trial judge improperly
refused to stay.68 Although this fact was noted in the court of appeals'
opinion,69 it did not appear to be in any way a part of the court's
analysis or holding. In RPR & Associates, it does appear that the
similarly situated defendant may have participated in the trial of the
matter-even while arguing that the superior court judge had no
jurisdiction to conduct the trial. Although the RPR & Associates
court does not expressly state that this "two bites at the apple"
strategy on the part of the defendant is the basis for its decision, one
wonders if it was a significant factor.
Nevertheless, like the
"reasonableness" of the trial court's conclusion that the Rule 12(b)
denials did not affect a substantial right, the actions of the appellant
in participating in the allegedly improper trial should have no impact
on the re-creation of trial court jurisdiction that was properly ousted
pursuant to the long-established functus officio rule.7"
C.

Interlocutory Orders That Do Not Affect a SubstantialRight but
Are Somewhat Final: Certificationof Appeal by Trial Court
Pursuantto Civil Rule 54(b)

Immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is also allowed if the
order is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties, and the
66. RPR & Assocs., 153 N.C. App. at 349, 570 S.E.2d at 515; cf Vance Constr. Co. v.
Duane White Land Corp., 127 N.C. App. 493, 494, 490 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1997) (vacating
the trial court's order based on the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to consider the matter

before it, without any mention or consideration of whether any party had shown prejudice,
and expressly denying the relevance of both parties' willingness and consent for the trial
court to rule on the matter).
67. 7 N.C. App. 44, 171 S.E.2d 58 (1969).

68. Id. at 45, 171 S.E.2d at 59.
69. Id.
70. "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(h). The appellate court can dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on its own motion even if
the parties did not object at trial or attempt to appeal the issue. Vance Constr. Co., 127
N.C. App. at 494, 490 S.E.2d at 590; Ramsey v. Interstate Insurors, Inc., 89 N.C. App. 98,
102, 365 S.E.2d 172, 175 (1988) (noting an appellate court may raise the question of

subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion, even if the question of jurisdiction were not
argued by the parties in their briefs); see also Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate
Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity To Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 1253, 1280 (2002) (observing that it is widely accepted for appellate courts to
resolve cases on jurisdictional grounds even if the parties did not raise the issue).
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trial court certifies the case for appealpursuant to Civil Rule 54(b) by
finding that there is no just reason for delay. Thus, Rule 54(b) can
apply when more than one claim for relief is presented or when
multiple parties are involved, and the trial court enters a "final" order
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.
Although still interlocutory, this "final" interlocutory order is
immediately appealable based on the trial court's certification and
finding.7 The following cases make it clear that only certain kinds of

interlocutory orders can be classified as "final" and so be eligible for
Rule 54(b) certification.72
In Anglin-Stone v. Curtis,73 the trial court allowed plaintiff's Rule

60(b) motion and granted relief from its earlier judgment dismissing
plaintiff's case.74

Because further proceedings in the case then

became necessary, the order was interlocutory and was not final as to
any claim-despite the trial court's certification under Rule 54(b).75
Similarly, in Cagle v. Teachy, 76 the court of appeals found that the

denial of a motion for summary judgment was not a final judgment
and so would not be immediately appealable even if the trial court
attempted to certify it for appeal under Rule 54(b).77
In Tridyn Industries,Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance Co.,7" the

trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue of liability
alone, leaving a genuine issue as to damages.79 The supreme court
held that even if the case were considered a "multiple claim lawsuit"
within the meaning of Rule 54(b), the partial summary judgment was
71. Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 490, 251 S.E.2d 443, 446
(1979). In Tridyn, the court stated:
Rule 54(b) modifies the traditional notion that a case could not be appealed until
the trial court had finally and entirely disposed of it all.... The rule should be
seen as a companion to other rules of procedure which permit liberal joinder of
claims and parties.... In multiple claim or multiple party cases the trial court
may enter a judgment which is final and which fully terminates fewer than all the
claims or claims as to fewer than all the parties.
Id. at 490, 251 S.E.2d at 446-47.
72. See also Eastover Ridge v. Metric Constructors, 139 N.C. App. 360, 363-64, 533
S.E.2d 827, 829 (2000) (granting the defendant's partial summary judgment motion on the
plaintiff's unfair and deceptive trade practice claim). The court of appeals held that
because this interlocutory order was "dispositive of that claim," and because the trial court
certified that there was no just reason for delaying the appeal, the appeal was proper
pursuant to Rule 54(b).
73. 146 N.C. App. 608,553 S.E.2d 244 (2001).
74. Id. at 609, 553 S.E.2d at 244.
75. Id. at 609-10, 553 S.E.2d at 244-45.
76. 111 N.C. App. 244,431 S.E.2d 801 (1993).
77. Id. at 247,251 S.E.2d at 803.
78. 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979).
79. Id. at 490, 251 S.E.2d at 447.
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not "final" as to either possible claim-despite the trial court's
declaration to the contrary.80 Again, the court stated that the trial
judge could not "by denominating his decree a 'final judgment' make
it immediately appealable under Rule 54(b) if it is not such a
judgment."'"
When individual claims in a multiple claim lawsuit are finally and
completely resolved, a Rule 54(b) certification is effective. For
8' the trial court's order
instance in Creech v. Ranmar Properties,
denied the plaintiff recovery on several causes of action, holding that
"this is a final judgment as to the Plaintiff's First, Third, Fifth and
Sixth Causes of Action and there is no just reason for delay in
entering this order pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b)."83 The court of
appeals held that although this was an interlocutory order, as the trial
court's judgment failed to resolve the plaintiff's second and fourth
causes of action, and the defendants' counterclaim, "the trial court's
judgment operates as a final judgment as to plaintiff's first, third, fifth
and sixth causes of action, and it contains the trial court's certification
pursuant to Rule 54(b). Therefore, plaintiff's appeal is properly
before us."84
Even if the order is a proper "final" interlocutory order, it is not
clear whether the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification is reviewable
by the court of appeals. In DKH Corp. v. Rankin-PattersonOil Co.,
Inc.,85 the trial court granted the defendant partial summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiff's unfair practice claim and certified that there
was no just reason for delay under Rule 54(b).86 The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal but the supreme court reversed, holding that it
was a final interlocutory order and that the court of appeals was
required to hear the appeal.87 It remains uncertain whether a trial
court's Rule 54(b) certification is reviewable by the court of appeals.
Yet, the court of appeals has stated that the trial court's certification
of no just reason to delay the appeal does not bind the appellate

80. Id. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447.
81. Id. Just as the trial court's designation of an interlocutory order as "final" does
not control its certifiability under Rule 54(b), Rule 54(b) certification also does not require
the trial court to certify that the order or judgment is a "final judgment." Guthrie v.
Conroy, 152 N.C. App. 15, 18, 567 S.E.2d 403,406-07 (2002).
82. 146 N.C. App. 97, 551 S.E.2d 224 (2001).
83. Id. at 99, 551 S.E.2d at 227.
84. Id. at 99-100, 551 S.E.2d at 227.
85. 348 N.C. 583, 500 S.E.2d 666 (1998).
86. Id. at 584, 500 S.E.2d at 667.
87. Id. at 584, 585, 500 S.E.2d at 667, 668.
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court.88 It is assumed that if the attempted appeal is improper under
Rule 54(b), as in the case when the attempted appeal is improper
under section 1-277(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, the
functus officio rule does not apply and the trial court is not thereby
deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with the case.89

II.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AUTHORITY PENDING APPEAL

The Trial Court Retains Basic Authority over Its Judgments and
Records

North Carolina case law establishes that trial judges have the
authority to modify any order or final judgment during the session9" in
which the order or judgment was rendered. Until the session ends,
the judgment or order remains in fieri.9' Additionally, even after the
session expires, the trial court retains the authority to make
ministerial corrections to its orders or judgments. 2 This power arises
from the trial court's inherent power and duty to make its records
speak the truth.93 This power is never constricted or limited by mere
passage of time.94 The authority to correct its records does not allow
88. See Laws v. Horizon Hous., Inc., 137 N.C. App. 770, 770-71, 529 S.E.2d 695, 696
(2000).
89. There would seem to be no reason to treat improper appeals under Rule 54(b)
and section 1-277(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina differently with regard to
the functus officio rule-although as a practical matter, if the trial court approved of the
immediate appeal by issuing the Rule 54(b) certification, then that trial court may be
unlikely to proceed with the litigation pending the appeal process.
90. "[A]lthough the words are frequently used interchangeably, 'term' in this
jurisdiction generally refers to the typical six-month assignment of superior court judges to
a judicial district, while 'session' designates the typical one-week assignment to a
particular location during the term." State v. Smith, 138 N.C. App. 605, 607-08, 532
S.E.2d 235, 237 (2000), review denied, 353 N.C. 355, 543 S.E.2d 477 (2001).
91. See State v. McLamb, 208 N.C. 378, 384, 180 S.E. 586, 589-90 (1935) ("The
proceedings of a court are in fieri until the close of a term, and the judge may modify or
vacate any order made during the term, and his action is not reviewable unless it appears
that he has grossly abused his power, resulting in oppression."); Bowen v. Hodge Motor
Co., 29 N.C. App. 463, 464, 224 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1976) ("All proceedings of a court of
record in fieri are under the absolute control of the trial judge, subject to be amended,
modified or annulled at any time before the expiration of the term in which they are
done."), rev'd on othergrounds, 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977).
92. See State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 403, 94 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1956) (quoting Walton
v. Pearson, 85 N.C. 34, 48 (1881)) ("It is the duty of every court to supply the omissions of
its officers in recording its proceedings and to see that its record truly sets forth its action
in each and every instance .... ); see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a) ("Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record ... may be corrected by the judge at any
time on his own initiative or on the motion of any party .
.
93. Cannon, 244 N.C. at 403, 94 S.E.2d at 342.
94. Id.
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the trial court to reconsider any issues or modify any substantive
ruling.9" It permits the trial court only to amend the records to reflect
accurately the proceedings that actually took place, i.e., any corrected
order or judgment is a nunc pro tunc entry and relates back to the
date the original order or judgment was entered. Both the authority
to modify judgments in fieri and the authority to correct court records
survive the functus officio rule.
For instance, in In re Tuttle96 the trial judge announced the
judgment and sentence of the criminal defendant in open court.97 The
defendant immediately gave oral notice of appeal.98 Soon afterward,
during the same day and the same session of court, the trial court
made the additional finding that the defendant was not sentenced as a
committed youthful offender, and the judge ordered this finding
attached to the written judgment.9 9 The defendant filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had been sentenced to prison
without the statutorily-required finding that he would not derive
benefit from being sentenced as a committed youthful offender."°
The defendant argued that the judge's subsequent finding was a
nullity because the judge had no power to make any finding after
notice of appeal had been given."' The court of appeals rejected
defendant's argument. 02
It cited the basic rule that until the
expiration of the term, orders and judgments of the court are in
fieri. O3 The court also held that the judge has the discretionary power
to make such changes and modifications in them as appropriate,
stating that "[t]his is true notwithstanding that notice of appeal has
been given. ' 104
The authority to correct the court record can be more
complicated. For example, in State v. Dixon,0 5 the defendant
95. See Pratt v. Staton, 147 N.C. App. 771, 774-75, 556 S.E.2d 621, 624 (2001)
(concluding that the trial court's amended order "altered the substantive rights of the
parties" by adding a Rule 54(b) certification and therefore was not an appropriate
correction of a clerical error pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure); S.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hamlett, 142 N.C. App. 501, 504, 543 S.E.2d 189, 191 (2001) ("This
Court has consistently held that Rule 60(a) applies to clerical omissions or errors only, and
may not be used to change the substantive rights of the parties.").
96. 36 N.C. App. 222, 243 S.E.2d 434 (1978).
97. Id. at 222, 243 S.E.2d at 434.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 222-23, 243 S.E.2d at 435.
100. Id. at 223, 243 S.E.2d at 435.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 225, 243 S.E.2d at 436.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 139 N.C. App. 332, 533 S.E.2d 297 (2000).
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appealed a judgment revoking his probation. °6 The appellate record
1 The State then moved for the
was settled and the appeal docketed. 07
trial court to correct the written judgment, alleging that it contained a
clerical error and did not accurately reflect what the judge found in
open court. 08 The trial judge granted the motion and entered a
corrected judgment. 10 9 The State moved for the court of appeals to
amend the appellate record to include the amended judgment and the
motion was granted."0 On appeal, the defendant conceded that the
original written judgment did not accurately reflect the judgment of
the trial court as rendered in open court, but argued that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to correct the judgment after the defendant
had given notice of appeal and the record on appeal had been filed
with the court of appeals."' The court of appeals agreed with the
defendant." 2 The court acknowledged the "universally recognized"
inherent power and duty of a court of record to make its records
speak the truth, and that no lapse of time deprived the trial court of
this authority over its own records." 3 Dixon, however, cited North
Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(b)(5), and held that once a
case has been docketed in the appellate court, the appellate court
acquires jurisdiction over the record, so that after the record on
appeal has been filed with the appellate court, the trial court may
amend or correct the record only upon a directive from the appellate
court." 4 Thus, a motion to correct or amend a judgment in order to
make it speak the truth "is properly made to the appellate court
rather than the trial court 5once the record on appeal has been filed
with the appellate court.""1
A related issue concerns the authority of the trial court to
106. Id. at 335, 533 S.E.2d at 301.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 336, 533 S.E.2d at 301.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 337, 533 S.E.2d at 301.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 337, 533 S.E.2d at 302.
114. Id. at 338, 533 S.E.2d at 302. Rule 9(b)(5) states:
On motion of any party the appellate court may order any portion of the record
on appeal or transcript amended to correct error shown as to form or content.
Prior to the filing of the record on appeal in the appellate court, such motions
may be made by any party to the trial tribunal.
N.C. R. APp. P. 9(b)(5). Compare North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), which
states: "[D]uring the pendency of an appeal, such [clerical] mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate division, and thereafter while the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate division." N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a).
115. Dixon, 139 N.C. App. at 338,533 S.E.2d at 302.
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consider a motion to amend its findings or make additional findings
of fact pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
52(b) allows such a motion if made within ten days of entry of
judgment.116 In Parrish v. Cole,"7 the plaintiff made such a motion
and the trial court granted it despite defendant's having given notice
of appeal of the original judgment prior to the motion.1 8 On appeal,
defendant contended that the notice of appeal barred a subsequent
but timely motion to amend the findings of fact pursuant to Rule
52(b)."9 Parrishacknowledged the general rule that a timely notice
of appeal removes jurisdiction from the trial court and places it in the
appellate court, but the court stated: "[W]e feel that the best result is
reached by holding that a notice of appeal will not bar a party from
making a timely motion pursuant to Rule 52(b)."'20 The court
explained:
"[T]he primary purpose of Rule 52(b) is to enable the
appellate court to obtain a correct understanding of the factual
issues determined by the trial court." If a trial court has
omitted certain essential findings of fact, a timely motion under
Rule 52(b) can correct this oversight and avoid remand by the
appellate court for further findings and, perhaps, avoid multiple
appeals. Furthermore, a Rule 52(b) motion must be made
within ten days, a period which cannot be expanded by the trial
judge. Thus, a party must make a motion under Rule 52(b)
within ten days or his motion will be barred. This ten day grace
period is unlikely to disrupt the appellate process. A complete
record on appeal, resulting from a Rule 52(b) motion, will
provide the appellate court with a better understanding of the
trial court's decision, thus promoting the judicial process. 2 '
116. Rule 52(b) states that "[u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59." N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(b).
117. 38 N.C. App. 691,248 S.E.2d 878 (1978).
118. Id. at 692, 248 S.E.2d at 879.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 693, 248 S.E.2d at 879.
121. Id. at 694, 248 S.E.2d at 879-80 (citations omitted). See York v. Taylor, 79 N.C.
App. 653, 654-55, 339 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1986) (stating that the "trial court is not divested of
jurisdiction to hear and rule on a Rule 52(b) motion even though notice of appeal has
been given"); see also Hightower v. Hightower, 85 N.C. App. 333, 336, 354 S.E.2d 743, 745
(1987) (holding that pursuant to the provisions of Rule 58 of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, the trial court retained the authority to approve and sign a judgment after
a defendant gives notice of appeal); cf.State v. Palmer, 334 N.C. 104, 108, 431 S.E.2d 172,
174 (1993) (finding that a written order that "appeared out of nowhere" in the court file
fifty-seven days after notice of appeal was part of the record on appeal despite the
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B.

Trial Court Retains Authority to Act in Aid of Appeal
Not surprisingly, the functus officio rule does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to take actions that aid the appellate court in
processing the appeal. 122 Statutes and rules have developed to define
this authority. For instance, section 1-283 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina and North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 11
provide for the judge's role in settling the record on appeal. The
statute expressly provides that the trial judge retains the power to
settle the record "notwithstanding he has resigned or retired or his
term of office has expired without reappointment or reelection since
entry of the judgment or order." '23 The power of retired or resigned
judges to settle the record on appeal is unique-the general rule is
that retired or resigned judges have no continuing authority to enter
orders in any case. 24 Pursuant to Rule 27(c) the trial court also
retains some authority to extend the time for service of the proposed
record on appeal or to extend the time to produce the transcript, but
125
this authority is limited.
In Strauss v. Hunt,26 the appellee failed to respond timely to the
appellant's service of the proposed record on appeal.2 7 The trial
court found that circumstances tolled the applicable time limit so that
the appellee was allowed to respond.128 The court of appeals denied
this authority to the trial court. 29 Emphasizing that the time
schedules set out in the Appellate Rules were designed to keep the
process of perfecting an appeal to the appellate division "flowing in
an orderly manner,"'3 ° the court held that:

defendant's arguments that the order was invalid because the trial court was functus
officio).
122. Hoke v. Atd. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 376, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947)
(describing the duty of the trial judge to settle the record on appeal and resolve certain
service issues).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-283 (2001). Rule 36 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure addresses the situation if the trial judge is no longer available to
settle the record. See N.C. R. App. P. 36.
124. In re Pittman, 151 N.C. App. 112, 116, 564 S.E.2d 899, 901-02 (2002); see also
Thomas L. Fowler, Retired Judges, Substitute Judges, and Civil Rule 63, N.C. ST. B.J.,
Winter 2002, at 24, 24-26 (discussing In re Pittman and Rule 63 of the revised North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure).
125. N.C. R. App. P. 27.
126. 140 N.C. App. 345, 536 S.E.2d 636 (2000).
127. Id. at 347, 536 S.E.2d at 638.
128. Id. at 347-48, 536 S.E.2d at 638.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 349, 536 S.E.2d at 639 (quoting State v. Gillespie, 31 N.C. App. 520, 521, 230
S.E.2d 154, 155 (1976)).
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Our trial judges may not toll the time periods for serving
and settling the record on appeal contained in the Rules. Trial
judges may only grant extensions of time for good cause shown
to allow a court reporter an additional thirty days to produce
the transcript or to allow the appellant to "extend once for no
more than 30 days the time permitted by Rule 11 ... for the

service of the proposed record on appeal." Further deviations
or extensions of time under the Rules can only be granted by
the appellate division.'

Thus, all motions made to extend time, except for motions to extend
the time for service of the proposed record on appeal, and motions to
extend the time to produce the transcript, must be made to the
appellate courts.
The trial court also retains authority to dismiss the appeal,
pursuant to Rule 25, for failure to perfect the appeal. 3 2 For instance,
in Farm Credit Bank of Columbia v. Edwards,'3 3 the plaintiff's motion

to dismiss the defendants' appeal was properly made in the trial court
rather than in the court of appeals because although the defendants
had filed notice of appeal, the appeal had not yet been filed and
34
docketed in the court of appeals.
The failure to perfect an appeal addressed by Rule 25 is one way
to abandon an appeal.'
North Carolina cases establish that the trial

court retains authority to determine other ways in which the appellant
has "abandoned" its appeal so that the trial court's jurisdiction to
proceed with the case is regained.'36 There has been some
131. 140 N.C. App. at 349, 536 S.E.2d at 639 (citations omitted); see N.C. R. APp. P.
27(c)(2).
132. Rule 25 provides: "Prior to the filing of an appeal in an appellate court motions to
dismiss are made to the court, commission, or commissioner from which appeal has been
taken; after an appeal has been filed in an appellate court motions to dismiss are made to
that court." N.C. R. App. P. 25.
133. 121 N.C. App. 72, 464 S.E.2d 305 (1995).
134. Id. at 75, 464 S.E.2d at 306.
135. See Whitfield v. Todd, 116 N.C. App. 335, 337, 447 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1994) ("The
qualification that an appeal may be dismissed when adjudged abandoned has been further
codified by N.C. R. App. P. 25(a)."); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 385, 261
S.E.2d 491, 494 (1980) (holding that the defendant's notice of appeal from the trial court's
order did not prevent the trial court from entering further orders in the cause, since the
defendant's failure to perfect his appeal by the time such orders were entered almost three
months later constituted an abandonment that reinvested the court with jurisdiction to
render further orders in the cause).
136. See generally Suzanne Morgan Leary, Note, Civil Procedure-Bowen v. Hodge
Motor Co.: Abandonment of Appeal in North Carolina,56 N.C. L. REV. 573, 575 (1978)
(exploring abandoned appeals). Leary notes:
Historically, the qualification that a trial judge can, upon a proper showing, judge
an appeal abandoned applied principally to situations in which an appellant
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uncertainty, however, as to what action by the appellant can be
legitimately construed as an abandonment.
In Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co.,' the judge granted a directed
verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff gave notice of appeal. 3 8
Subsequently, the plaintiff made a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, which was granted by the trial judge. 39
The court of appeals, relying on the supreme court's opinion in Sink
v. Easter,4 ' held that the plaintiff's motion to dismiss voluntarily his
action without prejudice and the subsequent appearance of the
parties at the hearing thereon constituted an abandonment of the
plaintiff's appeal from the directed verdict for the defendant. 4 1 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals noting that the court of
appeals' reliance on Sink was misplaced:
This case should not be interpreted as holding that the mere
filing of a motion directed to an order or judgment from which
an appeal has previously been taken and the appearance at a
hearing thereon constitutes an abandonment of the prior
appeal, nothing else appearing.

... On this record there is neither notice nor proper showing
by the plaintiffs that they abandoned their appeal nor any
judgment by the trial court to that effect. The appeal, then, was
still pending when plaintiffs filed their Rule 41(a)(2)
motion
142
and when it was heard and ruled on by the trial court.
Bowen, then, appeared to reject the possibility, seemingly
adopted by Sink, that the trial court may find an implied
abandonment of the appeal. Indeed, this seems to be the rule now
followed by North Carolina courts. For instance, a 1991 case, Kirby

failed to prosecute his appeal.... The rationale [for the rule] was that an
appellee should have the fruit of his judgment promptly and thus is entitled to
have an appeal that was taken but not prosecuted dismissed.
Id. at 575-76.
137. 29 N.C. App. 463, 224 S.E.2d 699 (1976), rev'd, 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748
(1977).
138. Id. at 463, 224 S.E.2d at 698.
139. Id. at 464, 224 S.E.2d at 700.
140. 288 N.C. 183, 198, 217 S.E.2d 532, 542 (1975) (stating that "the general rule that an
appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction becomes inoperative when the trial judge, after
due notice and on a proper showing, adjudges that the appeal has been abandoned").
141. 29 N.C. App. at 466, 224 S.E.2d at 701.
142. Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633,636, 234 S.E.2d 748,748, 751 (1977).
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Building Systems v. McNiel,'43 cites Bowen for the proposition that
"[a]bandonment of an appeal exists only where there is express
notice, showing, and judgment of abandonment of appeal. Only then
does the appeal cease to be pending."'"
C.

Trial Court Retains Authority to Act on UnrelatedMatters After
Notice of Appeal

1. Jurisdiction to Hear Collateral Matters: Different Parties or
Separable Issues
There is authority for the proposition that the trial court also
retains power to consider matters unaffected by the order or
judgment being appealed.'45 For instance, when there are multiple
parties involved in the proceeding but only one party is appealing and
the matter being appealed is insular, appellate courts have allowed
the trial court to proceed with matters affecting only the
nonappealing parties. In Jenkins v. Wheeler,146 the trial court granted

one defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiff gave notice of
appeal.147 Subsequently, a co-defendant moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, and the trial court granted that motion. 48 The
plaintiff argued that because of the pending appeal the trial judge
lacked authority to hear the second defendant's motion.'4 9 The court
of appeals disagreed, finding that the first order of dismissal in favor
of the first defendant, from which the plaintiff had appealed, "did not
touch upon or affect the subject matter" of the second order of
dismissal in favor of the second defendant. 5 Since the second
motion was not a matter embraced within or affected by the appeal,
the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction to consider and rule on
the matter. 5'
143. 327 N.C. 234, 393 S.E.2d 827 (1990).

144. Id. at 240, 393 S.E.2d at 831.
145. "[U]pon filing of a notice of appeal, a trial court in North Carolina is divested of
jurisdiction with regard to all matters embraced within or affected by the judgment which is
the subject of the appeal." Brooks v. Giesey, 106 N.C. App. 586, 590-91, 418 S.E.2d 236,
238 (1992) (emphasis added); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2001) (addressing stays of
proceedings).
146. 72 N.C. App. 363,325 S.E.2d 4 (1985).
147. Id. at 364, 325 S.E.2d at 5.
148. Id. at 364-65, 325 S.E.2d at 5.
149. Id. at 365, 325 S.E.2d at 5.
150. Id.

151. This was also the result in Bullock v. Newman, in which the North Carolina Court
of Appeals stated that "[t]he court retained jurisdiction to hear defendant hospital's
motion after plaintiff had taken the appeal from the order granting defendant Newman's
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This exception can also apply when the parties are the same but
the subject matter of the motion is sufficiently separable from the
matter being appealed. In Cox v. Dine-a-Mate, Inc.,152 the court of
appeals reviewed the substantive matters pending on appeal and
concluded that those issues were not involved in the plaintiff's motion
to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with a separate action in
another state. 153 The propriety of the action in another state "was not
a question involved in the then-pending appeal of the North Carolina
'
Action."154
Similarly, in High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. MorganSchultheiss,'55 the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim and plaintiff filed notice of
appeal.'56 The defendant subsequently moved for and was granted
default judgment against the plaintiff on the defendant's
counterclaims. 5 7 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the appeal of
the summary judgment divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter
the default judgments.'5 8 The court of appeals disagreed, finding the
principal action and the counterclaims sufficiently separable.15 9
2. Jurisdiction to Hear the Prevailing Party's Claim for Attorney Fees
Pursuant to this analysis, should a trial court have the authority
to consider a party's motion for attorney fees-arguably a collateral
matter-while the judgment on which the attorney fees claim is based
is on appeal? The issue is complicated and is one with which other
jurisdictions have wrestled. In the federal courts the question initially
arose as whether a final decision on the merits was a final judgment
for appellate purposes even if the attorney fee matters remained to be
determined."6 It is, of course, arguable that a purported "final"
judgment on the merits that leaves attorney fees questions
undetermined, is, nevertheless, in actuality an interlocutory order, as
it does not finally dispose of the case but requires further action. If
so, appealing such an order, at least based on its being a final

motion for summary judgment as it was 'not affected by the judgment appealed from.' "
93 N.C. App. 545, 551, 378 S.E.2d 562, 565 (1989) (quoting section 1-294 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina).
152. 131 N.C. App. 542,508 S.E.2d 6 (1998).
153. Id. at 545, 508 S.E.2d at 8.
154. Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

33 N.C. App. 406, 235 S.E.2d 693 (1977).
Id. at 431,235 S.E.2d at 707.
Id. at 411-12, 235 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 431, 235 S.E.2d at 707.
Id.
See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
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judgment, would have to await the court's decision on any claim for
attorney fees.
In White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security,16' months after securing a judgment on the merits, the

plaintiff moved for attorney fees as authorized by statute. 162 Because
the plaintiff had not included any request for attorney fees in his
complaint, the court of appeals held that the motion for attorney fees
was a motion to alter or amend the final judgment under Rule 59(e),
and that, as such, it was untimely. 163 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the attorney fee issue was "uniquely
separable" from the final judgment on the merits, so that its
resolution did not require an amendment of the otherwise final
judgment pursuant to Rule 59.14 Although White did not directly

address appealability issues, several circuits concluded that White
established that a judgment on the merits was final for appeal
purposes, even if it did not include a final determination of attorney
fees.'65

The United States Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation
in 1988 in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.'66 In Budinich, the

defendant won a judgment on-the merits and the trial court denied
the plaintiff's timely motion for a new trial. 167 Two and a half months
later the trial court entered its final order regarding attorney fees,
and, at that time, the plaintiff filed notice of appeal. 168 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that this notice of appeal was not
timely, i.e., it was not effective to appeal the judgment on the merits
because that judgment was "final" for appellate purposes on the date
the motion for a new trial was denied.169 Thus, the time to appeal that

"final" judgment had run long before the decision resolving attorney

161. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
162. Id. at 447-48.
163. White v. N.H. Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455
U.S. 445 (1982).
164. White, 455 U.S. at 452.
165. Other circuits rejected this clear rule and "persevered in drawing distinctions
between attorney fee theories collateral to the merits and those integral to the merits,
reasoning that the statutory theory involved in the White case was collateral to the
merits." 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 3915.6, at 329 (2d ed. 1991).
166. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
167. Id. at 197-98.
168. Id. at 198.
169. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co. 807 F.2d 155, 159 (10th Cir. 1986), affd,
486 U.S. 196 (1988).
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fees was filed.1 7° The Supreme Court agreed and adopted the brightline rule that "a decision on the merits is a 'final decision'.., whether
or not there remains for adjudication a request for attorney's fees
17 1
attributable to the case.",
One consequence of the rule adopted in Budinich for the federal
courts is that the trial court has authority to consider and resolve a
party's motion for attorney fees even after the final judgment on the
merits has been appealed and the appeal is pending. 72 At least in the
federal courts, notice of appeal does not render the trial court functus
officio with regard to the attorney fee issue. The order awarding
attorney fees, entered during the pendency of the appeal, is
separately appealable and requires its own notice of appeal. 73
It appears that North Carolina follows part, but not all, of the
rules outlined in Budinich. In Gibbons v. Cole,74 the trial court

granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
the plaintiff filed notice of appeal. 75 Several weeks later the trial
court held a hearing on the defendants' motion for attorney fees, and
several weeks after that the trial court entered a "final order"
granting the defendants' attorney fees motion. 76 The plaintiffs then
gave notice of appeal from the trial court's award of attorney fees to
the defendants. 77 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to proceed on the attorney fee motion
after appellants filed the appeal of the judgment on the pleadings.178
The court of appeals agreed, citing section 1-294 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina and stating:
The trial court's decision to award attorneys fees was clearly
affected by the outcome of the judgment from which plaintiffs
appealed. Accordingly, the appeal by plaintiffs from the
judgment on the pleadings deprived the superior court of the
authority to make further rulings in the case until it returns

170. See id.
171. Budinich, 486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988).
172. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 165, at 338-44.
173. See discussion and cases cited, WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 165, at 340-44. In
cases where the attorney fee award is not appealed but the judgment on the merits is
reversed on appeal, a party may seek relief from the attorney fee award pursuant to Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Id. at 344.
174. 132 N.C. App. 777,513 S.E.2d 834 (1999).
175. Id. at 778-79, 513 S.E.2d at 835.
176. Id. at 779, 513 S.E.2d at 835.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 782, 513 S.E.2d at 837.
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from this Court.179

Thus, Gibbons seems to indicate that a judgment on the merits is
final for appellate purposes even if it does not resolve the attorney fee
question, and the attorney fee decision is separately appealable
requiring its own notice of appeal. This interpretation is supported by
the case of Okwara v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,"80 where the
plaintiff argued that the defendants' motions for attorney fees should
be time-barred because the motions were made two years after the
trial court's initial resolution of the case.18' The court of appeals
noted that "[t]he usual practice in awarding attorneys' fees is to make
the award at the end of the litigation "when all the work has been
done and all the results are known."'82 In Okwara, although the trial
court's ruling was two years in the past, the litigation had not actually
ended until July of 1998, when the plaintiff's petition for discretionary
review of the judgment on the merits was denied by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. 183 The attorney fee motions were filed in
August and September of 1998, and the court found this to be "within
a reasonable time after the 'results were known,' " and therefore not
time-barred.'
Unlike the federal courts, which follow the rule of Budinich
the North Carolina trial courts do not appear to have jurisdiction,
pending the appeal of the final judgment on the merits, to hear and
resolve the attorney fee question. 86 The apparent holding of
Gibbons that the trial court lacks authority to enter an order
awarding attorney fees after notice of appeal of an appealable order'87
finds support in several other cases. 88 But in Overcash v. Blue Cross
179. Id.
180. 136 N.C. App. 587, 525 S.E.2d 481 (2000).
181. Id. at 592, 525 S.E.2d at 485.
182. Id. (quoting Baxter v. Jones, 283 N.C. 327, 331, 196 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1973)).
183. Id.
184. Id. But cf. Rice v. Danas, Inc., 132 N.C. App. 736, 739-41, 514 S.E.2d 97, 99-100
(1999) (holding that a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, filed almost seven months after the
judgment had been entered on the jury verdict, was not filed within a reasonable time of
detecting the alleged improprieties).
185. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
186. But see Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Harrelson, 111 N.C. App. 815, 818, 434 S.E.2d 229
(1993) (noting that "judicial economy favors the hearing of petitioner's motion for
attorney's fees only after the judgment has become final, thereby avoiding piecemeal
litigation of the issue"); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Richards, 90 N.C. App. 650, 652, 369
S.E.2d 620, 621 (1988) (stating that the trial court "reserved ruling on defendants' request
for attorneys' fees until final disposition of this appeal").
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 579-81, 273 S.E.2d 247, 258 (1981)
(citing the "well-established" rule of law that an appeal from a judgment suspends further
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ND & Blue Shield,189 the court of appeals stated, somewhat
inconsistently, that the filing of notice of appeal "did not
automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions [in
the form of attQrneys' fees] pursuant to Rule 11," citing as authority
the provision in section 1-294 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina that "an appeal does not bar the trial court from proceeding
'upon any other matter included in the action and not affected by the
judgment appealed from.' "190 And in Nohejl v. First Homes of
Craven County, Inc.,' 91 the court found that notice of appeal did not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees.192
On January 28, 1994, the Nohejl court found the defendant in
civil contempt. 93 On February 23, 1994, the defendant filed notice of
appeal from the contempt order. 9 4 The contempt order was filed
with the clerk of court on July 14, 1994.'1 The plaintiffs then made a
motion for attorney fees on July 26, 1994.196 The trial court held a
The court ruled that because
hearing on August 15, 1994.197
of appeal, it did not have
notice
defendant had previously filed
jurisdiction to enter an order regarding attorney fees. 9 ' The court
noted it would have awarded attorney fees of $5,280.00 to the
plaintiffs' attorney if it had jurisdiction over the matter. 9 9 On August
proceedings); Oshita v. Hill, 65 N.C. App. 326, 330, 308 S.E.2d 923, 926-27 (1983) (holding
that the supplemental judgment entered by the trial court was a nullity because the appeal
of the defendants from the original judgment "deprived the trial court of the authority to
make further rulings in the case"); Condie v. Condie, 51 N.C. App. 522, 529, 277 S.E.2d
122, 125-26 (1981) (holding that the trial judge did not have authority to enter an order
requiring plaintiff to pay an attorney fee, since no mention of an attorney fee was made in
the final judgment, and the trial judge could not enter an order in the cause since the
matter was on appeal pursuant to the notice of appeal).
189. 94 N.C. App. 602, 381 S.E.2d 330 (1989).
190. Id. at 617, 381 S.E.2d at 340 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2001)). Overcash
also cites two federal cases that held that neither the termination of the action nor the
defendant's filing of notice of appeal automatically deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. Id. (citing Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. S.
Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1987), and Orange Production Credit Ass'n v. Frontline
Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1986)). But cf Johnson v. Harris, 149 N.C. App. 928,
932, 563 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2002) (holding that "the termination of an action by means of a
Rule 41 dismissal does not deprive either the trial court, or the appellate court, of
jurisdiction to consider collateral issues such as sanctions").
191. 120 N.C. App. 188,461 S.E.2d 10 (1995).
192. Id. at 191,461 S.E.2d at 12.
193. Id. at 190, 461 S.E.2d at 11.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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29, 1994, the plaintiffs filed' notice of appeal from this order. °°
Without elaboration, the court of appeals stated: "[W]e find the trial
court maintained jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees .... 201
Additional questions are raised by the case of the Surles v.

Surles, °2 where ten weeks after the final judgment on the merits was
entered and plaintiff filed notice of appeal, the trial court conducted
the hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney fees. 203 The court
awarded attorney fees, and the plaintiff filed a separate notice of

appeal of this order.2 ° On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial
court was without jurisdiction, to allow the defendant's motion for
attorney fees once notice of appeal of the final judgment on the
merits had been given by the plaintiff.205 The court of appeals
disagreed, because at the time it rendered judgment on the merits, the
trial court had expressly reserved for itself the issue of attorney fees,
and accordingly, "it retained the authority to consider the issue since
attorney's fees were within the court's 'oral announcements.' "206
3. Jurisdiction to Hear a Civil Rule 59 or 60 Motion
Another question that regularly arises in the functus officio

context is whether the trial court can hear and decide a Civil Rule 59
or 60 motion after notice of appeal. 20 7 For instance, the issues raised

by a proper Rule 60(b) motion 208 are arguably collateral to any issue
200. Id.
201. But cf. In re Will of Dunn, 129 N.C. App. 321, 329-30, 500 S.E.2d 99, 104-05
(1998) (holding that the trial court did not err in a caveat proceeding by ruling upon
petitions for costs and attorney fees after filing of notice of appeal because the decision to
award costs and attorney fees was not affected by the outcome of the judgment from
which caveator appealed).
202. 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 661 (1993).
203. Id. at 42-43, 437 S.E.2d at 666-67.
204. Id. at 43, 437 S.E.2d at 667.
205. Id. at 42, 437 S.E.2d at 666.
206. Id. at 43, 437 S.E.2d at 667.
207. See Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 111, 184 S.E.2d 879, 881-882 (1.971) (stating
that the general rule is not changed by Civil Rules 59 and 60); York v. Taylor, 79 N.C.
App, 653, 654, 339 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1986) (stating that a "trial court does not have
jurisdiction ... to rule on motions pursuant to Rule 60(b) where such motion is made after
the notice of appeal has been given"). But see Talbert v. Mauney, 80 N.C. App. 477, 47879, 343 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1986) (stating that the "trial court retains limited jurisdiction to hear
and consider a Rule 60(b) motion to indicate what action it would be inclined to take were
an appeal not pending").
208. An improper Rule 60(b) motion would be one used as a substitute for appeal.
Nations v. Nations, 111 N.C. App. 211, 215, 431 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1993) (stating that Rule
60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal). Another improper Rule 60(b) motion
would be to give relief from an interlocutory order. See Pratt v. Staton, 147 N.C. App. 771,
775, 556 S.E.2d 621, 624 (2001) ("By its express terms, Rule 60(b) only applies to final
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that could be the proper subject of an appeal; the case law has long
established that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used as a substitute
for appellate review. 20 9 A Rule 60(b) motion addresses issues outside
of the record.210 It does not overrule a prior judgment but simply

relieves the parties from the effect of that judgment.211 Thus, in
theory, the trial court might retain jurisdiction to hear a Rule 60(b)
motion after notice of appeal.212
This question was the precise issue in Wiggins v. Bunch,2 13 and
the supreme court held, as an issue of first impression, that the
general rule that notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction
was not changed by the adoption of Civil Rules 59 and 60.214 Thus,
there was no authority for the trial judge to consider and decide the
plaintiff's Rule 59215 and Rule 60216 motions after the plaintiff's notice
judgments, orders, or proceedings; it has no application to interlocutory orders.").
209. "[E]rroneous judgments may be corrected only by appeal and Rule 60(b) motions
cannot be used as a substitute for appeal." Burton v. Blanton, 107 N.C. App. 615, 617, 421
S.E.2d 381, 383 (1992); see also In re Brown, 23 N.C. App. 109, 110, 208 S.E.2d 282, 283
(1974) (holding that a 60(b) motion, used as a substitute for appeal, was properly denied
by the trial court and that a 60(b) appeal does not subject the judgment from which relief
is sought to appellate review).
210. Rule 60(b) serves as "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case." Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Tucker, 131 N.C. App. 132, 137, 505
S.E.2d 179, 182 (1998) (citing Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Peartree, 28 N.C. App. 709, 712,
222 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1976)). The decision to grant relief under Rule 60(b) is a matter of
trial court discretion. Chandak v. Elec. Interconnect Corp., 144 N.C. App. 258, 262, 550
S.E.2d 25, 28 (2001). Grounds for a Rule 60(b) motion include mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
211. See Charns v. Brown, 129 N.C. App. 635,639, 502 S.E.2d 7,10 (1998).
212. Similarly, Rule 59 contains some grounds for a new trial that are outside of the
record and so might be considered collateral. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 59. On the other hand,
Rule 59(a)(8) also provides a remedy for correcting an erroneous judgment and therefore
can function as a substitute for direct appeal. See Hagwood v. Odom, 88 N.C. App. 513,
519, 364 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1988) (stating that the "appropriate remedy for errors of law
committed by the court is either appeal or a timely motion for relief under" Rule 59).
Such a motion, however, must be made within ten days of the entry of judgment. See N.C.
R. Civ. P. 59(b).
213. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971).
214. See id. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 881-82.
215. See Seafare Corp. v. Trenor Corp., 88 N.C. App. 404, 410-11, 363 S.E.2d 643, 649
(1988) (stating that the "trial court correctly held that it had no jurisdiction to grant a new
trial when notices of appeal were filed the same day"); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v.
Peartree, 24 N.C. App. 579, 580, 211 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1975) (holding that notice of appeal
filed the same day as a motion for a new trial removed the case from the jurisdiction of the
trial court).
216. One case may establish a very limited exception to this rule. In York v. Taylor,
the court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 60(b)
motion that is "filed contemporaneously with the notice of appeal" because "[i]t would be
incongruous for us to say that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 52(b)
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of appeal. After notice of appeal, the plaintiff should make any Rule
60(b) motion in the court of appeals, which can remand such motion
to the trial court if necessary. 17 This appears to be the rule followed
by a majority of the state courts, 218 although the federal courts
sometimes allow the trial courts to consider such post-judgment
motions.2 19

Although arguably inconsistent with the holding in Wiggins v.
Bunch, ° there is a line of cases from the court of appeals which
allows a trial court, even after notice of appeal, to render an advisory
decision on a Rule 60(b) motion to indicate how the trial court would
be disposed to rule if it had jurisdiction to rule. For instance, in
Talbert v. Mauney,22' the court of appeals stated that a trial court

retains limited jurisdiction pending an appeal "to hear and consider a
Rule 60(b) motion to indicate222
what action it would be inclined to take
pending.
not
appeal
were an

motion but was divested of jurisdiction to hear a Rule 60(b) motion filed at the same
time." 79 N.C. App. 653,655, 339 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1986).
217. See id.; see also Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 181-82, 264 S.E.2d 902,
907-08 (1980) (finding that because the case was pending on appeal, the plaintiff's Rule
60(b) motion was properly filed with the court of appeals, but remanding the case to the
trial court, which was in a "far better position to pass upon" the motion).
218. See George Blum, Annotation, Filingof Notice of Appeal As Affecting Jurisdiction
of State Trial Court to Consider Motion to Vacate Judgment, 5 A.L.R. 5th 422 (1992) ("the
majority of state courts take the view that, once an appeal is filed, the lower tribunal is
divested of jurisdiction to hear or rule upon a motion which attempts to vacate the very
order appealed from").
219. The federal courts are not settled on this question. Some cases hold that
jurisdiction continues despite notice of appeal, some hold that jurisdiction continues but
only to deny the Rule 60(b) motion, some hold that jurisdiction continues if the 60(b)
motion was filed but not heard before the notice of appeal, and some hold that notice of
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to consider the 60(b) motion. See
Annotation, Effect of Filing Notice of Appeal on Motion to Vacate Judgment Under Rule
60(b) of FederalRules of Civil Procedure,62 A.L.R. Fed 165 (1983).
220. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
221. 80 N.C. App. 477, 343 S.E.2d 5 (1986).
222. Id. at 478-79, 343 S.E.2d at 7; see also Bell v. Martin, 43 N.C. App. 134, 140-42,
258 S.E.2d 403, 408-09 (1979) (stating that the "better practice is to allow the trial court to
consider a Rule 60(b) motion filed while the appeal is pending for the limited purpose of
indicating, by a proper entry in the record, how it would be inclined to rule on the motion
were the appeal not pending"), rev'd on other grounds, 299 N.C. 715, 264 S.E.2d 101
(1979); Pheasant v. McKibben, 100 N.C. App. 379, 385, 396 S.E.2d 333, 337 (1990) ("A
trial court may consider a Rule 60(b) motion which is filed though an appeal is pending in
order to indicate how it would rule on the motion were the appeal not pending.");
Hagwood v. Odom, 88 N.C. App. 513, 518, 364 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1988) (citing Talbert and
Bell). Butsee Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 181-82,264 S.E.2d 902, 907-08 (1980)
(remanding the case to the trial court for a Rule 60(b) determination).

2003]

FUNCTUS OFFICIO

2363

D. Management of Cases Pending the Appeal: Some Statutory
Exceptions to the Functus Officio Rule
Certain cases sometimes require attention and management
during the appellate review process. Denying the trial court any
authority to address ongoing issues in the case during the pendency of
the appeal can result in injustice-particularly in cases involving
children, families, and criminal defendants. The courts and the
legislatures have wrestled with balancing the needs of the appellate
process to maintain the status quo and the need for some trial court
oversight during the pendency of the appeal.
For instance, in Joyner v. Joyner,223 the plaintiff-wife was
awarded custody of the minor child and the defendant-husband gave
notice of appeal.2 4 Several weeks later the wife filed an affidavit
claiming that the husband violated the custody order by forcibly
taking the child from her.225 The trial court issued a show cause order
and held a contempt hearing. 6 In its order, the trial court concluded
that the husband was in willful contempt but also noted the husband's
contention that the trial court was "functus officio and ... without
authority to make any further orders in the ... action pending the ...

appeal. '27 The court then dismissed the show cause proceeding.2 8
The supreme court affirmed the conclusion of the trial judge: "The
appeal stays contempt proceedings until the validity of the judgment
is determined. 2 29 The court also observed that the appeal did not
23
authorize any violation of the judgment or order being appealed. If
the judgment or order is upheld on appeal, upon remand to the trial
court, the trial court can proceed with any appropriate contempt
inquiries arising from a party's disobedience of court direction during
the pendency of the appeal.23'
The Joyner rule proved unpopular, particularly in domestic cases.
For instance, in Quick v. Quick,23 2 the defendant-husband appealed
an award of alimony and the plaintiff-wife, acknowledging that the
district court was without jurisdiction to hear any contempt matter by
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

256 N.C. 588, 124 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
Id. at 589, 124 S.E.2d at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 589-90,124 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 591,124 S.E.2d at 727.
Id. at 591, 124 S.E.2d at 726.
Id.
305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).
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virtue of the appeal, asked the supreme court to hold the defendant in
contempt for refusing to pay alimony pursuant to the trial court's
order. 233 The court declined to hear the contempt issue, stating that
the supreme court does not hear matters requiring factual findings.2 11
But, it was sympathetic to the plaintiff-wife's plight. The court noted:
On oral argument, counsel for plaintiff urged this Court to
devise a means to resolve this impasse because it occurs
frequently to the detriment of dependent spouses. Counsel
correctly argued that supporting spouses have a lengthy period
of virtual immunity from support obligations while cases work
their way through the appellate process....

We agree with counsel for plaintiff that a more satisfactory
answer should be found, but that answer can come only from
the Legislature.235
The answer ultimately came from the legislature in a series of
new statutes and amendments.
The statute providing for
enforcement of custody orders was amended to provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294, an order
pertaining to child custody which has been appealed to the
appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by
proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the
appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the
appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any
order for civil contempt entered for child custody until the
appeal is decided, if justice requires.236
The statute providing for enforcement of actions for support of minor
children 237 and the statute for enforcement of alimony and post233. Id. at 461-62, 290 S.E.2d at 663.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 461-62, 290 S.E.2d at 663-64.
236. Act of June 15, 1983, ch. 530, sec. 2, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 450 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.3(a) (2001)). This language was added in 1983. See id.
237. The statute was amended to provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294, an order for the payment of child
support which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the
trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal.
Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which
the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child
support until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.
See 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 450 (emphasis added). This language was added in 1983. See id.
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separation support 238 were similarly amended.

The authority to enforce orders pending appeal did not
necessarily reinvest the trial court with full pre-appeal authority. For
instance, in Hackworth v. Hackworth,2 39 in a March 1986 order arising

out of a custody hearing, the trial court determined that substantial
evidence presented at the hearing justified a significant expansion of
the plaintiff-father's visitation rights with the child. 24° The defendantmother appealed this decision.24 1 The plaintiff-father filed a second
motion in the cause requesting primary custody of the child while the
defendant-mother's appeal of the visitation order was pending. 24 2 The
trial court concluded that the defendant-mother had been a fit and
proper parent, but the relationship between the plaintiff-father and
the child had strengthened significantly, and that an award of primary
custody to the plaintiff-father was in the child's best interest.243 The
trial court awarded primary custody to the plaintiff-father in an
October 1986 court order, but the defendant-mother prevented the
transfer of custody to the plaintiff-father, and she was subsequently
found in contempt of court on November 3, 1986.244 The defendant
appealed both the October 1986 order awarding plaintiff primary
custody and the November 1986 order finding the defendant in
contempt of court, arguing that defendant's appeal of the March 1986
order removed from the district court jurisdiction to hear and to issue
orders pertaining to the plaintiff's later motions for custody of the
minor child. 245 The court of appeals held that the district court lacked
the authority to issue the October and November orders.246 The court
cited both section 1-294 of the General Statutes of North Carolina
and Joyner v. Joyner24 7 to conclude that "under both statute and case
238. The statute was amended to provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294 or G.S. 1-289, an order for the
periodic payment of alimony that has been appealed to the appellate division is
enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the
pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the
appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil
contempt entered for alimony until the appeal is decided if justice requires.
See Act of June 27, 1985, ch. 482, sec.1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 537 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.70) (2001)) (emphasis added). This language was added in 1985. See id.
239. 87 N.C. App. 284, 360 S.E.2d 472 (1987).
240. Id. at 285, 360 S.E.2d at 472.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 285-86, 360 S.E.2d at 472.
244. Id. at 286, 360 S.E.2d at 472.
245.

Id.

246. Id. at 287, 360 S.E.2d at 473.
247. For a discussion of Joyner, see supra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
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law the district court lost jurisdiction over all custody matters in the
present case when defendant appealed the 5 March 1986 visitation
2 48

order. ,

In Cox v. CoX,249 on the other hand, the defendant was ordered
to show cause as to why he should not be held in contempt for his
failure to comply with a previous court order directing him to pay
alimony to the plaintiff.2 ° The defendant properly appealed the
alimony order and thus argued that under section 1-294 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina and case law, he could not be
held in contempt by the trial court pending appeal of the underlying
order. 25' The court of appeals found that a new statute, section 5016.70) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, modified the
applicability of both section 1-294 and the Joyner rule,252 and left the
trial court "not withoutjurisdiction" to issue the show cause order and
subsequent contempt order, pending the appeal. 3
This timid endorsement of the impact of the new statutes finds
some support in a 1999 case, Burnett v. Wheeler.254 In Burnett, the
defendant appealed a child support order and did not make the
payments as ordered. 5 After the court of appeals remanded the case
to the trial court for additional findings of fact, the plaintiff moved
the trial court to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to make
the support payments.2 6 The trial court found the defendant in
contempt.257 On appeal of this contempt order, the court of appeals
cited "the current version" of section 50-13.4(f)(9) of the General
Statutes of North Carolina, and described it as "granting the trial
court continuing jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings even while
an appeal is pending. '258 The court then stated: "Having never lost
jurisdiction over this issue, the district court could hold a contempt
hearing at any time. "259 Maybe Burnett overstates the impact of the
amendment to section 50-13.4(f)(9) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, but maybe not.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

87 N.C. App. at 287, 360 S.E.2d at 473.
92 N.C. App. 702,376 S.E.2d 13 (1989).
Id. at 703, 376 S.E.2d at 14.
Id. at 703, 376 S.E.2d at 15.
See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
Cox, 92 N.C. App. at 704, 376 S.E.2d at 15.
133 N.C. App. 316, 515 S.E.2d 480 (1999).
Id. at 317, 515 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 318, 515 S.E.2d at 482.
Id.
Id. at 319, 515 S.E.2d at 483.
Id.
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A recent case, Rosero v. Blake ,26 either clarifies or confuses the
relationship of Joyner, section 1-294 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, and the statutes that allow limited trial court jurisdiction
pending appeal for actions involving child custody and support. In
Rosero, the defendant-mother appealed from an order granting
primary legal custody of the minor child to the plaintiff-father, and
from an order dismissing her motion for a protective order.2 6' She
made a motion in the trial court for the protective order
approximately one week after she filed her notice of appeal from the
custody order.262 Her motion for a protective order was based on her
allegation that the plaintiff-father had abducted the child from her
custody.263 She requested the trial court both to "issue an injunction
protecting the child by prohibiting the plaintiff from taking her from
the defendant's physical custody at any time unless agreed upon by
the parties in advance or ordered by" the trial court and to order that
the plaintiff "return the child to the defendant's home
immediately."' 26 The trial court dismissed the motion, stating that
because the custody order was on appeal, the trial court was without
jurisdiction to grant the relief defendant requested. 265 The defendant
also petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of supersedeas.266 The
court denied defendant's petition, but the court's order stated that the
trial court retained jurisdiction to entertain motions based on
defendant's allegations so that it might "enter any interlocutory
orders needed to enforce the custody order or to protect the interests
of the parties
and the welfare of the child pending the outcome of the
26 7
appeal.
In resolving this matter, the Rosero court cited both section 1-294
of the General Statutes of North Carolina and Joyner for the
proposition that an appeal of a custody order leaves the trial court
functus officio as to all custody matters until the case is remanded.2 68
Nevertheless, the court cited section 50-13.3(a) of the General
Statutes of North Carolina as supporting the conflicting propositions
that the trial court's duty to protect the minor child's welfare
260. 150 N.C. App. 250, 563 S.E.2d 248 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 357 N.C. 193,
581 S.E.2d 41 (2003).
261. Id. at 250-51, 563 S.E.2d at 249-50.
262. Id. at 251, 563 S.E.2d at 250.
263. Id. at 252, 563 S.E.2d at 250.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting the order).
268. Id. at 252-53, 563 S.E.2d at 250-51.
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continues pending the outcome of the appeal, and that, as stated in
the order denying the writ of supersedeas, the trial court retained
jurisdiction "to entertain any motions ...to protect the interests of
the parties and the welfare of the child pending the outcome of the

appeal. '269 But neither the basis for these propositions, nor the
application of these propositions to the court's resolution of the
matter before it, were adequately explained by the court.
Instead, the court observed that "the relief sought by defendant
appears to be directed toward staying the custody order pending
appeal" and concluded:
Both statutory and case law direct that the trial court lost
jurisdiction over all matters dealing specifically with custody in
this case when defendant appealed the custody order of the trial

court. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly
determined that it was without jurisdiction to grant defendant's
motion, which was directly related to and would have affected
the custody order that was on appeal.270

Other statutes create limited exceptions to the functus officio rule in

the area of criminal law, 271 and much broader exceptions for juvenile
law, including delinquency, 27 2 abuse and neglect, 273 and termination of

269. Id. at 253, 563 S.E.2d at 251 (quoting the order).
270. Id. at 253-54, 563 S.E.2d at 251.
271. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1451 (2001) (providing that when a criminal
defendant gives notice of appeal, payment of costs and fines is stayed, and probation is
stayed, but confinement is stayed only when defendant has been released on bail); id.
§ 15A-1453(a) (providing that a court in which a criminal defendant was convicted retains
authority to act with respect -to the defendant's release on bail); id. § 15A-1448(3)
(providing generally that the jurisdiction of the trial court is divested upon notice of
appeal except for certain ancillary actions during appeal); id. § 15A-1414(c) (providing
that a motion for appropriate relief, filed within ten days of judgment, may be made in the
trial court regardless of whether notice of appeal has been given); see also id. § 15A-1418
(describing motion for appropriate relief in the appellate division).
272. Section 7B-2605 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides:
Pending disposition of an appeal, the release of the juvenile, with or without
conditions, should issue in every case unless the court orders otherwise. For
compelling reasons which must be stated in writing, the court may enter a
temporary order affecting the custody or placement of the juvenile as the court
finds to be in the best interests of the juvenile or the State.
§ 7B-2605.
273. Section 7B-1003 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides:
Pending disposition of an appeal, the return of the juvenile to the custody of the
parent or guardian of the juvenile, with or without conditions, may issue unless
the court orders otherwise. When the court has found that a juvenile has
suffered physical abuse and that the individual responsible for the abuse has a
history of violent behavior, the court shall consider the opinion of the mental
health professional who performed the evaluation under G.S. 7B-503(b) before
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parental rights.274
CONCLUSION

Some of the functus officio rule's exceptions make sense in the
context of protecting and effectuating the right of appeal. Denying an
unprincipled party the power to postpone litigation by filing notice of
appeal of a non-immediately appealable interlocutory order is logical
and fair, even if it can lead to some confusing situations-as was the
275
case in Patrick v. Hurdle
and RPR & Associates, Inc. v. University
of North Carolina-ChapelHill.276 Permitting a trial court to correct its

own errors in a timely fashion, through the in fieri rule, Civil Rules 52
and 59, and the motion for appropriate relief statute for criminal
cases, is more efficient than a literal application of the functus officio
rule. The trial court also has a clear, if limited, role in supervising the
transformation of the litigation into the manageable documentation
that will serve as the basis for the appeal, i.e., the appellate record.
But the justifications for some of the other exceptions to the functus

officio rule are not as compelling.
returning the juvenile to the custody of that individual. For compelling reasons
which must be stated in writing, the court may enter a temporary order affecting
the custody or placement of the juvenile as the court finds to be in the best
interests of the juvenile or the State. The provisions of subsections (b), (c), and
(d) of G.S. 7B-905 shall apply to any order entered under this section which
provides for the placement or continued placement of a juvenile in foster care.
§ 7B-1003.
274. Section 7B-1113 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides:
Any juvenile, juvenile acting through the juvenile's guardian ad litem if one is
appointed, parent, guardian, custodian, or agency who is a party to a proceeding
under this Article may appeal from an adjudication or any order of disposition to
the Court of Appeals, provided that notice of appeal is given in writing within 10
days after entry of the order. Entry of an order shall be treated in the same
manner as entry of a judgment under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 58 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pending disposition of an appeal, the court may enter
a temporary order affecting the custody or placement of the juvenile as the court
finds to be in the best interests of the juvenile or the best interests of the State.
Upon the affirmation of the order of adjudication or disposition of the court in a
juvenile case by the Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme Court in the event of
an appeal, the court shall have authority to modify or alter its original order of
adjudication or disposition as the court finds to be in the best interests of the
juvenile to reflect any adjustment made by the juvenile or change in
circumstances during the period of time the case on appeal was pending,
provided that if the modifying order be entered ex parte, the court shall give
notice to interested parties to show cause, if any there be, within 10 days
thereafter, as to why the modifying order should be vacated or altered.
§ 7B-1113.
275. See supra notes 29-34, 67-69 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
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Other jurisdictions have allowed trial court consideration of
attorney fees claims and post-judgment matters as are allowed under
Civil Rule 60(b) pending appeal. The best approach for handling
these issues may not be to allow the trial court complete freedom to
consider these matters pending the appeal, but the North Carolina
cases do not seem to have fully explored the possibilities or to have
fully explained the reasons for the existing rules. The case law could
also be clearer in delineating the difference between the functus
officio rule's jurisdictional limitations and the stay provisions of
statutes like section 1-294 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina-i.e., whether their impact is identical and redundant so that
they overlap perfectly, or whether they are distinguishable and
address at least some different issues. Finally, in the difficult areas of
domestic and juvenile law, the case law still may leave the trial courts
guessing as to their proper role in managing the troubled parties and
the sometimes volatile situations that develop while the appellate
courts process an appeal.
Some of the compromises that have been reached between the
clear needs of our appeals process and the equally clear concerns with
the injustice and inefficiency that can accompany the unavoidable
delay occasioned by appellate review would benefit from further
consideration and explication by our appellate courts.

